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ABSTRACT      
Among political institutions, there is no doubt that political parties have dominated the political and 
social life during the 3rd Greek Republic. Even though many scholars have argued that parties 
constitute strong organizations that have invaded the state and the society, we believe that, in 
terms of organization, they constitute weak structures ruled by strong leaders. We will argue that 
leadership elections constitute sensitive moments generating crises in the two major political 
parties, PASOK and New Democracy, which are even more intense once leadership election 
denotes a moment of innovation. Our main hypothesis is that when leadership election is marked 
by an innovative process, which has been extraordinarily introduced, it makes allowances for 
maneuver, rendering the crisis inevitable. This is certainly related to the low level of 
institutionalization and the predominance of the leaders or certain party actors vis-à-vis the party 
structures. In that case, the intra-party debate focuses mainly on the rules that should be followed 
and less on the candidates’ programs. That said, the context and the intra-party power correlations 
play a crucial role in the rules that prevail. The constant change in the rules of the game causes 
new crises, which the party hardly overcomes once the new leader imposes his authority on the 
organization. Because the political actor is always stronger than the institution, the old and new 
structures are weak, which re-generates the crisis.  
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WORK IN PROGRESS.  
 
Ever since the transition to democracy in 1974, parties have renewed the political scene, 
contributed to the consolidation of democracy and proved their ability to survive and 
overcome political crises (Lyrintzis 2005). Their central role in the functioning of the state, 
organizing the public space, aggregating social demands, socializing the citizens, has been an 
uncontroversial issue among political scientists (Voulgaris 2001). The quick subordination of 
the state machinery by the two major political parties (Sotiropoulos 1996) is said to have 
gradually turned statism to a major ideology, culture and practice in politics and public life. 
Parties have used the state resources in order to satisfy their political clienteles, reinforce 
party loyalty, limit political competition and ensure their own electoral success. Many terms 
have been employed to describe the dominance of political parties, among which party 
democracy (Pappas 1999), cartelization (Vernardakis 2011), partitocracy (Kontogiorgis 2012) 
and tribe-parties (Lygeros 2011) constitute only a few. Since the beginning of the current 
economic crisis, the strong state-party linkages have been interpreted as signs of the 
omnipotence of political parties and certainly pointed as one of its several culprits, favoring 
patronage (Pappas & Assimakopoulou forthcoming), corruption (Lygeros 2011), and 
impeding a normal development of the economic private sector (Doxiadis 2010). 
Although this explanation is all the more gaining ground in the current public debate, 
this paper focuses on one of the unpopular and least debated aspects of Greek political parties, 
namely their organizational dimension. We believe that, in terms of organization, parties 
constitute weak structures ruled by strong leaders and this is mainly due to their genetic 
models and imperfect intitutionnalization. We will focus on the moments of leadership 
election of the two most important political parties, in order to show that all the more they 
have constituted a moment of innovation, which generates crises.  
Our main hypothesis is that when leadership election is marked by an innovative 
process, extraordinarily introduced, a crisis is highly likely to be generated. This is related to 
the low level of institutionalization and the predominance of the leaders or certain party actors 
vis-à-vis the party structures. In that case, the intra-party debate focuses mainly on the rules 
that should be followed and less on the candidates’ programs. That said, the context and the 
intra-party power correlations play a crucial role in the rules that prevail. The constant change 
in the rules of the game causes new crises, which the party overcomes once the new leader 
imposes his authority on the organization. Because, in such cases, the political actor is 
stronger than the institution, the old and new structures are weak, which re-generates the 
crisis.  
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Candidate selection in general, as well as leadership selection in particular constitute 
one of the most important chapters in politics, since selection methods have significant 
consequences not only for aspects of intra-party life – like the party’s physiognomy, 
articulation of ends and strategy - but also for central aspects of democracy, such as 
participation, representation, competition and responsiveness. (Hazan & Rahat 2006: 109-
121). Formal rules concerning, among others, leadership selection are a zone of uncertainty1, 
the control of which is decisive for internal power games. “To establish formal rules is to 
mold the “playing field” and to choose the terrain upon which confrontations, negotiations, 
and power games with other organizational actors will take place… He who can interpret the 
rules reinforces his position vis-à-vis the other organizational actors” (Panebianco 1988:33-
36). In addition, controlling the rules allows one to passively tolerate deviations from them. 
“In every organization there are latent rules that are not observed due to a tacit agreement, 
identified by Downs as “the institutionalization of deviation from the written norms”” 
(Panebianco 1988). The establishing of rules, the manipulation of their interpretation and their 
enforcement are therefore zones of uncertainty, of organizational unpredictability, whose 
control is another decisive resource in power relations (Panebianco 1988:33-36).  
To our mind, the study of candidate selection should be explored through the prism of 
the institutionalization of political parties. According to Panebianco, institutionalization refers 
to the way the organization solidifies, meaning the process “by which it slowly loses its 
character as a tool: it becomes valuable in and of itself, and its goals become inseparable and 
indistinguishable from it. In this way, its preservation and survival become a goal for a great 
number of its supporters” (Panebianco 1988: 53). For this to happen, Panebianco singles out 
two criteria: the degree of autonomy vis-à-vis its environment and the degree of internal 
systemness or interdependence of different sectors. We are to explore the change in the rules 
of leadership election in the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and New Democracy 
(ND), focusing our analysis not just on the formal rules and procedures, but also on the 
dynamics produced among intra-party actors and internal groups before and after the 
transformation rules. Throughout our analysis, we will explore the procedures taking into 
account the two criteria of institutionalization. 
Shortly after the transition to democracy, Konstantinos Karamanlis founded ND, which 
ever since has remained the standard bearer of liberal conservatism in Greece. The impressive 
54.3 per cent of the national vote received by the party in the first democratic election in 
November 1974 associated the first important years of the party institutionalization with the 
party in public office. No matter how several initiatives in terms of party assembling have 
                                                
1 According to Panebianco (1988: 33-36), there are mainly six activities, which constitute the zones of 
uncertainty: competency, environmental relations management, internal communication, formal rules, 
organizational financing and recruitment. 
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been organized2, throughout the 1970s the party organization remained fluid and 
insignificant, with practically no intermediate or peripheral associations and a rather 
personalized system of decision making following the top-down practice of the pre-junta 
parties (Vamvakas & Panagiotopoulos 2010: 357-360). ND would remain in power for the 
next seven years, during which it completed the consolidation of democracy and the accession 
of the country into the European Community. 
 
Election 
Year 
Candidates Elected 
Leader  
Selectorate Level of 
factionalism 
Splits  
1980 Averoff 
Rallis 
Rallis parliamentary 
group 
medium no 
1981 Averoff  
Boutos 
Stefanopoulos 
Averoff parliamentary 
group 
medium no 
1984 Mitsotakis 
Stefanopoulos 
Mitsotakis parliamentary 
group 
high no 
1985 Mitsotakis Mitsotakis parliamentary 
group 
high Stefanopoulos 
(Democratic 
Renewal) 
1993 Evert 
Varvitsiotis 
Evert 
 
Selected 
party agency 
medium no 
1996 Evert 
Souflias 
Evert Selected 
party agency 
high no 
1997 Evert 
Karamanlis 
Polydoras  
Souflias 
Karamanlis Party 
congress 
high Manos & 
Souflias 
 
2009 Bakoyanni 
Psomiadis 
Samaras 
Samaras party rank-
and-file & 
sympathizers 
high Bakoyanni 
(Democratic 
Coalition) 
 
 
Table 1. Leadership election in ND, 1980-2009. 
                                                
2 Pre-congress at Chalkidiki (May 1977), first party congress at Chalkidiki (May 1979), seven regional 
congresses (May 1979-May 1980). 
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The first leadership election in ND took place in May 1980. Karamanlis was elected 
head of state, and the filling of his positions of prime minister and party leader was decided 
after an election among the party parliamentary group. The competition between Averoff and 
Rallis ended with a victory of the latter by 50.2 per cent (88 votes) against 48 per cent (84 
votes) won by his opponent. However limited the selectorate might have been, this procedure 
constitutes a radical innovation in the history of Greek conservative parties. Despite being a 
moderate liberal politician, Rallis did not restrain the electoral decline of ND in the election 
of 1981, which accelerated the next leadership election. He was replaced only a year and a 
half after his election by his opponent Averoff, a staunch right-winger, following the same 
procedure of nomination after a vote by the parliamentary group3. Averoff marked significant 
progress in reinforcing the party’s organizational base towards the mass party model4 but led 
ND to ultra-conservative positions.  
The ideological blind alley with PASOK led to two consecutive electoral defeats and 
ultimately the third leadership election, through an intense internal dispute between the neo-
liberal Mitsotakis and the moderate conservative Stefanopoulos. The election of Mitsotakis 
with 70 votes (63 per cent) against 41 (37 per cent) won by Stefanopoulos marked the 
neoliberal turn of ND and culminated the polarized competition between the two major 
parties (Kalyvas 1997; Pappas 2009) that was to stay put until the two arch-enemies since 
pre-dictatorship years, Papandreou and Mitsotakis, would resign from politics in the mid-
1990s. In the midst of internal factionalism and dissentions due to the fourth consecutive 
electoral defeat in 1985, Mitsotakis was re-elected as a leader in August 1985, by a 
parliamentary vote contested by Stefanopoulos. Mitsotakis’ victory leads to the first serious 
split of the party related to leadership election5. Followed by nine deputies, Stefanopoulos 
forms a small personalized, conservative party named Democratic Renewal (DIANA), which, 
nonetheless, decisively contributed to the ascension of ND to power about five years later. 
During the second party congress in 1986, which reinforces the mass party physiognomy, 
Mitsotakis broadens the inclusiveness of the selectorate by introducing the leadership election 
through a selected party agency in the party statutes. Thus, Mitsotakis’s departure, after the 
                                                
3 Averoff received 60.4 per cent (67 votes) vis-à-vis Stefanopoulos who gained 28.8 per cent (32 votes) 
and Boutos 10.8 per cent (12 votes). 
4 Party organizations, bureaucracy and press were created; an intensive party life among the youth and 
branch organizations in labor spaces, as well as voluntary activities took place in order to assert the 
party penetration in all levels of social life. Party development becomes evident through evolution in 
membership rate: from100, 000 members in 1981 it increases to 500, 000 in 1985.  
5 The first official exit strategy took place in 1977, when the extreme right-wingers split and formed 
their own party, National Front (EP). Shortly before the 1981 elections Rallis reluctantly reabsorbed 
the EP renegades into ND. In July 1985 the chief deputy of the European parliamentary group of ND 
and leadership candidate in 1981, Boutos, left the party as well. 
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short interlude in power from 1990 to 1993, gives way to the first enlarged intra-party vote 
procedure.  
The vote was cast between Evert and Varvitsiotis, which was held before a special 
agency of 183 delegates, being constituted of MPs, European MPs and one delegate of each 
party organization per electoral region. Nevertheless, the parliamentary majority outnumbered 
the representatives of the party base by a 2:1 ratio (Pappas & Dinas 2006: 487). Even though 
Evert was elected with 77.5 per cent (141 votes)6, his mandate was marked by the deepening 
of internal polarization and the decline of the mass organization, which had, in the previous 
period, managed to raise membership to 420, 000 members in 1994, thus making ND the 
largest party among its European conservative counterparts (Kalyvas 1998: 99). The 
extensive internal rivalries under Evert took the form of ideological fight of the popular right 
over neo-liberalism. The party’s defeat in the 1996 national ballot led to the sixth leadership 
election by a limited number of delegates. Evert competed with Souflias and won by 54 per 
cent over 447, but dispute over his leadership was so extended that, within a year, he was 
practically overthrown by the party congress.  
Against all previous practices, the party congress decided to elect a new leader by a 
body of 5, 000 delegates8. The nephew of the party founder, Kostas Karamanlis, was elected 
on a two-round ballot9, in which the party deputies were but a minority10. Shortly after his 
victory, Karamanlis expelled several prominent cadres from the party - among them being 
Souflias, the defeated contender in the recent party leadership contest. Under the mandate of 
Karamanlis, ND developed a new, centripetal strategy (the so-called middle-ground thesis), 
redesigned its organizational structure, and applied novel electoral tactics which paid-off 
electorally ND with several electoral victories from 1998 to 200711 (Pappas & Dinas 2006: 
480-491). The grave electoral defeat of 2009 led to Karamanlis’ resignation and gave way to 
the eighth leadership election. As if to verify Duverger’s “contagion from the left” 
hypothesis, ND adopted an inclusive procedure, mainly by according the right to vote to the 
party rank-and-file and sympathizers, with the only presupposition of registering as party 
                                                
6 Varvitsiotis hardly managed to get hardly 20.3 per cent (37 votes). 
7 Among extreme polarization, Evert got 83 votes, and Souflias 84. 
8 The congress increased the proportion of deputies required to challenge the party leader from one-
third to 50 per cent of their total number and suspended the past ND leaders’ prerogative to participate 
ex officio in the highest party organs. 
9 In the first round Karamanlis gets 40.7 per cent, Souflias 30.52 per cent, Evert 25.3 per cent and 
Polydoras 3.4 per cent. In the second round, Karamanlis wins by a landslide (69.2 per cent over 30.8 
won by Souflias).  
10 Over 35 per cent of delegates participate as honorary members: MPs and elected representatives 
since 1974, ex-members of the central committee and the parliamentary group, ex-ministers, ex-vice 
ministers, and secretary generals of the party’s governments. 
11 Victory in the European parliament elections of 1999 and 2004, in the parliamentary elections of 
2004 and 2007 and a good performance in the local and regional elections of 1998, 2002, 2006. 
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members. The decision was taken through an extraordinary party congress in November 
2009, during which much intense debate led to the revision of party statutes regarding the 
issue. 782, 136 voted, choosing among Bakoyanni, Psomiadis and Samaras the last one 
winning by 50.06 percent of the vote12 and thus being declared as the party leader. Bakoyanni 
had criticized the inclusive procedure even before it was institutionalized by the extraordinary 
congress, which led to her being expelled in May 2010, even though the conventional reason 
was a vote in favor of the Greek bailout, against the official party line at that moment. 
Ironically, Bakoyanni was expelled from the party by Samaras, who back in 1993, as a 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, led her father’s government (Mitsotakis) to resignation in order 
to create a new party called Political Spring (POLAN). 
 What one can observe throughout the analysis of leadership election procedures in ND 
is that although internal factionalism and rivalries are present all over the period being 
explored, the party manages to preserve unity either when election takes place through a 
procedure already established and tested (1981, 1984, 1996), or when the changing of the 
intra-party rules takes place during regular and events anticipated by the procedures (1980, 
1993). On the contrary, each time a procedure is extraordinarily decided upon by the leader 
and/or by the dominant coalition (1986, 1997, 2009) and, furthermore, firstly introduced 
(1997, 2009), it is likely to generate crises. They become evident by the debate opened most 
often by the leader’s opponent or by ambitious cadres wishing to present their candidacy. 
Contesters question the pertinence and the legitimacy of changing the rules, or propose other 
rules, favorable to the characteristics of their allies and followers. In that case, the power of 
the new leader is affirmed through party splitting or member expelling.  
 Founded by Andreas Papandreou in 1974, PASOK soon managed to consolidate its 
position in the party system, by establishing itself as an entirely new party of a socialist 
identity, indulging novel ideas (Lyrintzis 2005). Throughout the 1970s, it gradually 
dominated the left bloc of the political spectrum, which had historically been identified with 
the Communist Party (KKE), mainly by incorporating into its program and discourse some of 
the main ideas and demands of the communist left (Rori 2008). PASOK managed to stay in 
power almost consecutively until 2004, with a short interlude in 1989 and another one from 
1990 to 1993. This formidable electoral performance cannot be interpreted without 
acknowledging the charismatic leadership of its founder, who, from the very early stages, 
succeeded in eliminating, the intra-party opposition and in postponing the ND’s political 
project by investing in polarization (Pappas 2009). PASOK’s historic victory in October 1981 
was followed by a gradual de-radicalization in policy-making, as well as abandonment of 
anti-European and anti-American stance (Rori 2002). Nonetheless, the party managed to 
                                                
12 Bakoyanni got 39.72 per cent and Psomiadis 10.22 per cent.  
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remain popular thanks to a populist rhetoric (Lyrintzis 1987; Pantazopoulos 2011), patronage 
politics (Pappas & Assimakopoulou forthcoming) and by advancing a new version of the old 
cleavage between the right wing and the anti-right wing forces during the 1980s (Moschonas 
2000).  
 
Election 
Year 
Candidates Elected 
Leader  
Selectorate Level of 
factionalism 
Splits 
1984 A. Papandreou A.Papandreou party 
congress 
(nomination) 
Low no 
1990 A. Papandreou A.Papandreou party 
congress 
(nomination) 
Low no 
1994 A. Papandreou A.Papandreou party 
congress 
(nomination) 
Low no 
1996 Arsenis 
Charalampopoulos 
Simitis 
Tsochatzopoulos 
Simitis 
 
parliamentary 
group 
(vote for 
head of 
parliamentary 
group) 
high no 
1996 Simitis 
Tsochantzopoulos 
Simitis party 
congress 
(vote) 
high No 
1999 Simitis Simitis party 
congress 
(vote) 
medium No 
2001 Simitis Simitis party 
congress 
(vote) 
high No 
2004 G. Papandreou G.Papandreou rank-and-file 
& 
sympathizers 
Low no 
2007 G. Papandreou 
Skandalidis 
G.Papandreou rank-and-file 
& 
sympathizers 
high no 
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Venizelos 
2012 Venizelos Venizelos rank-and-file 
& 
sympathizers 
high Katseli - 
Kastanidis 
(Social 
Agreement) 
 
Table 2. Leadership election in PASOK, 1984-2012. 
 
 As a charismatic party (Pappas 2009), PASOK remained weak in terms of 
organization. Instead of democratic procedures, it soon developed a structure of bureaucratic 
centralism, which becomes obvious if one looks closer to the intra-party leadership elections. 
The first congress takes place no sooner than ten years after the party foundation, when 
Papandreou is re-elected through a unanimous party vote. However in principle more 
democratic and inclusive than the first leadership elections of ND, Papandreou’s control over 
the party goes uncontested. Practically all the elections until his retirement follow the same 
pattern, since there is no competitive vote but a nomination by the party congress, taking the 
form of a unanimous vote. The unexpected event of Papandreou’s hospitalization in January 
1996 forces the parliamentary group to urgently vote for a Prime Minister, according to the 
Constitution but against the will of the dominant coalition, who praised for a vote by the party 
congress.  
 Following the intense competition and polarization among four candidates, Costas 
Simitis is elected13 through a body of 167 deputies, a fact that gives him a competitive 
advantage in view of the fourth party congress six months later. The first competitive and 
perhaps most polarized intra-party vote in the history of the party takes place juxtaposing a 
moderate, reformist and pro-European candidate (Simitis) to a strongman of the party 
apparatus, representing the traditional party theses (Tsochatzopoulos). Even though there 
were significant differences in terms of political priorities, values and physiognomy between 
the two candidates, the vote was cast neither according to their discourse or ideology, nor 
following the precedent factional dynamics. Whilst Tsochatzopoulos, backed up by the party 
apparatus, proposed a dual model of leadership, Simitis placed the selectorate before a 
dilemma claiming that either he would be leader of the party and Prime Minister, or he would 
resign and the party would lose power. Simitis won this zero sum game 14, but constant 
                                                
13 In the first round Simitis and Tsochatzopoulos gain 53 votes each (31.7 per cent), whereas Arsenis 
takes 50 votes (29.9 per cent) and Charalampopoulos 11 votes (6.6 per cent). In the second round 
Simitis comes first with 86 votes (51.5 per cent) whilst Tsochatzopoulos gets 75 (44.9 per cent).  
14 Simitis is elected with 53.8 per cent, whereas his opponent gets 45 per cent. 
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factionalism and internal opposition marked his mandate. This became manifest at the next 
two congresses, when a part of the delegates refused to back up his candidacy15.  
 From 1996 to 2004 the country marked significant progress in Europeanization, fiscal 
consolidation, building infrastructure, and establishing procedures of transparency in the 
public sector. Despite the achievements of the party in public office, Simitis was all the more 
openly contested by the party in central office and significant party actors (unions, intra-party 
factions), in a way that canceled the scheduled reforms. He, therefore, decided to resign from 
the party presidency shortly before the 2004 national ballot by proposing the candidacy of 
Giorgos Papandreou, a son of the party’s founder. Since Papandreou was not competed by 
any candidate, this election would have been almost of no interest, if it had not been marked 
by an innovative procedure, maximizing the inclusiveness of the selectorate to almost all 
citizens wishing to participate. The unprecedented participation16 altered the negative 
ambiance that had doomed the socialist camp in the previous period. It failed, nonetheless, to 
convince the electorate regarding the innovative leader’s project, as – among other reasons - a 
series of mistakes during the campaign cancelled the positive connotations of the radical 
promises for party transformation (Rori 2008).  
 The lack of competition and the campaign context stimulated tolerance vis-à-vis the 
extraordinary change in the leadership election rules, even though no debate took place in the 
party organs in 2004. Contest and dispute over the rules of the game would be suspended 
until the next occasion. Hence, after four consecutive electoral defeats, Papandreou was 
seriously distrusted in the aftermath of the 2007 ballot. Doubt over his capability to bring the 
party to power opened the procedure of a leadership change, where the innovation of 2004 
would be applied for the first time in substance - in a competitive base, that is. Through 
extreme polarization and factionalism over the rules and the rituals of the procedure, the open 
leadership election was consolidated by the participation of 769, 156 of citizens. Among 
Papandreou, Skandalides and Venizelos, it is the first who managed to re-elect, undoubtedly 
favored among others (symbolic significance of the name, mistakes of the opponent, better 
distribution of selective incentives) by the extensive control over zones of uncertainty due to 
the access he had to the party machinery17 (Rori 2009). Even though the defeated candidates 
recognized the result of the election, the initial ambition of Venizelos to create a think tank 
that would institutionalize his faction prolonged the crisis in the after-math of the procedure. 
After several months of latent negotiations with the new dominant coalition, Venizelos 
abandoned his plan, which was interpreted as an acceptance of the leader’s authority.  
                                                
15 During the fifth party congress in 1999 he is re-elected by 65.7 per cent, whereas in the seventh 
congress in 2001 he gets 71.2 per cent. 
16 The official number given by the party is that of one million citizens. 
17Papandreou gets 55.91 per cent of the vote, Venizelos 38.18 percent and Skandalidis 5.74 per cent. 
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 The strategy of loyalty and the preservation of unity will pay off Venizelos five years 
later. After the resign of Papandreou from the head of government in November 2011, due to 
grave deficiencies in handling the political crisis generated after his decision to propose a 
referendum for the second memorandum of cooperation with the Troika, a coalition 
government was formed, directed by an EU technocrat, Lukas Papademos. The completion of 
the governments’ mission gave way to electing a new leader in the socialist party since 
Papandreou’s mandate was officially over and the loss of legitimacy, credibility and 
popularity minimized his chances to get re-elected. His marginalization and the defeat of his 
strategy motivated two of his close supporters and dissidents of the current policy backed by 
PASOK, Katseli and Kastanidis, to follow an exit strategy and form a new party in the left of 
PASOK, whereas a series of party cadres moved to other parties. Regardless of the fact that 
other splits had taken place in the past (Arsenis 1986, Tsovolas 1995), it is the first time that it 
has been related to the crisis generated among others concerning the leadership election.  
 From November 2011 until March 2012, in the midst of expulsions and splits, as well 
as extreme social pressure related to the economic crisis there was an on-going debate inside 
the party concerning the procedure that should be followed in order to decide the candidacies 
and the selectorate. Grosso modo, two lines were struggling each time: whether the party 
should proceed following the statutes or whether the rules should be “interpreted” taking into 
account the extraordinary circumstances of the crisis (grave decline in the party’s popularity, 
polarization and violence towards the political personnel, expels and factionalism in 
extremis). In terms of selectorate, the dilemma was whether the election should be an 
inclusive, open procedure or whether it should take place among the parliamentary group. In 
terms of candidacy, it was whether the party apparatus should stay in the letter of the statutes 
and allow candidacies of cadres that can concentrate the number of signatures demanded or 
whether it should allow for other cadres to compete. After intensive negotiations, alliances 
and ambitions expressed, the unofficial conformation of the dominant coalition that was 
under construction decided to preserve the “letter of the statutes”, that is to maintain the open 
election and the candidacies concentrating all the official characteristics. Although it was a 
decision favoring Venizelos’ candidacy, it was the least risky way to maintain the unity, if not 
the survival of the party organization in a sensitive turmoil where intra-party competition 
would have hampered the weak organization that since many years had been falling apart. 
Therefore, despite internal disagreement and opposition, 236, 151 citizens are said to have 
participated in Venizelos’ election, who received 230, 105 votes18. Even though none of the 
ambitious cadres managed to present their candidacy, they accepted the result and the 
authority of the new leader. 
                                                
18 According to the official party results, there were 1, 384 blank and invalid votes.  
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 In the case of PASOK, what one can observe is that since the death of its founder, who 
had been uncontested, almost all leadership change procedures have been preceded and 
followed by intense internal dissentions, factionalism and crises. Among them, most of all 
those who adopt innovative selection procedures. To this pattern, the leadership change of 
2004 constitutes an exception, merely because of the party’s genetic model: the nomination of 
George Papandreou makes reference to the party founder and draws legitimacy from its 
symbolic significance. After all, that was the very advantage that favored the election of the 
young and inexperienced Karamanlis in 1997, even if, unlike Papandreou, he was nominated 
after a competitive election. In contrast to ND, PASOK suffers from less splits related to 
leadership elections, what, in our opinion, ought to be associated to the fact that most of the 
times during the procedure PASOK is in power (1984, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2012), 
whereas ND is in opposition (1981, 1984, 1985, 1993, 1997, 2009). By satisfying selective 
incentives of its cadres and members through the means of access to state resources, PASOK 
succeeded in preserving unity better than ND, but at the expense of reforms and changes that 
received blunt intra-party opposition. 
 In conclusion, innovation in leadership elections in both parties offers a supplementary 
arena to the rival candidates to distinguish themselves and to bargain conditions of 
competition in their favor. That said, it is not the rules of the process per se that provoke 
crises, but the weak institutionalization of the party related to the way it was formed in the 
first crucial years. The interpretation of the rules according to the interest of the dominant 
coalition, the frequent change in the rules of the game, as well as the contestation of 
leadership authority even in the aftermath of the election manifest a weak respect of 
significant party actors in the institution and a low level of systemness. In order for this 
“transformism” to be a profitable and practical strategy, the party’s incentive system in both 
cases tends to provide far more material or selective incentives than collective ones. This is 
why it becomes easier for a change in party leadership to be consolidated whilst the party in 
government than in the opposition. Hence, programs and policy-making all the less constitute 
arenas of negotiation and deliberation inside ND and PASOK, whereas their ideology and 
identity become all the more insignificant. That said, this is a mechanism that reinforces 
leaders and party actors but weakens the institution as a whole and puts in peril its stability, as 
well as its survival in the long term. Weak systemness renders the institution vulnerable to its 
environment and reduces its autonomy vis-à-vis external shocks. Recent grave crises in both 
major parties, as well as their strong contestation and loss of credibility vis-à-vis their 
traditional electorates constitute nothing more that evidence of their superficial strength.  
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